Discrimination against any group or class of citizens in the exercise of these constitutionally protected rights of citizenship deprives the electoral process of integrity. The theme of the Constitution is equality among citizens in the exercise of their political rights. The notion that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to our standards for popular representative government.
Although legislative apportionment controversies are generally viewed as involving urban-rural conflicts, much evidence indicates that presently it is the fast-growing suburban areas which are probably the most seriously underrepresented in many of our state legislatures.
And, while currently the thrust of state legislative malapportionment results, in most States, in underrepresentation of urban and suburban areas, in earlier times, cities were, in fact, overrepresented in a number of States. In the early 19th century, certain of the seaboard cities in some of the Eastern and Southern States possessed and struggled to retain legislative representation disproportionate to population, and bitterly opposed according additional representation to the growing inland areas.
Conceivably, in some future time, urban areas might again be in a situation of attempting to acquire or retain legislative representation in excess of that to which, on a population basis, they are entitled.
Malapportionment can, and has historically, run in various directions. However and whenever it does, it is constitutionally impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause. The British experience in eradicating "rotten boroughs" is interesting and enlightening. Parliamentary representation is now based on districts of substantially equal population, and periodic reapportionment is accomplished through independent Boundary Commissions. For a discussion of the experience and difficulties in Great Britain in achieving fair legislative representation, see Edwards, Theoretical and Comparative Aspects of Reapportionment and Redistricting: With Reference to Baker v.
Carr, 15 Vand. See also the discussion in Baker v. Frankfurter, J. Under the existing scheme, Marshall County, with a population of 48,, Baldwin County, with 49,, and Houston County, with 50,, are each given only one seat in the Alabama House, while Bullock County, with only 13,, Henry County, with 15,, and Lowndes County, with 15,, are allotted two representatives each.
And in the Alabama Senate, under the existing apportionment, a district comprising Lauderdale and Limestone Counties had a population of 98,, and another composed of Lee and Russell Counties had 96, Conversely, Lowndes County, with only 15,, and Wilcox County, with 18,, are nevertheless single-county senatorial districts given one Senate seat each.
An interesting pre- Baker discussion of the problem of legislative malapportionment in Alabama is provided in Comment, Alabama's Unrepresentative Legislature, 14 Ala. See the cases cited and discussed in notes supra, where the Alabama Supreme Court refused even to consider the granting of relief in suits challenging the validity of the apportionment of seats in the Alabama Legislature, although it stated that the legislature had failed to comply with the requirements of the State Constitution with respect to legislative reapportionment.
However, since the District Court found the proposed constitutional amendment prospectively invalid, it was never, in fact, voted upon by the State's electorate. Resemblances between the system of representation in the Federal Congress and the apportionment scheme embodied in the Senator Amendment appear to be more superficial than actual.
Representation in the Federal House of Representatives is apportioned by the Constitution among the States in conformity with population. Thus, only four seats in the Federal House are distributed on a basis other than strict population. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, holding such congressional districting unconstitutional. Thus, it could hardly be argued that the proposed apportionment of the Alabama House was based on population in a way comparable to the apportionment of seats in the Federal House among the States.
For a thorough statement of the arguments against holding the so-called federal analogy applicable to state legislative apportionment matters, see, e. See the discussion of the District Court's holding as to the applicability of the federal analogy earlier in this opinion, supra at U. Thomas Jefferson repeatedly denounced the inequality of representation provided for under the Virginia Constitution and frequently proposed changing the State Constitution to provide that both houses be apportioned on the basis of population.
In , he wrote that. And a few years later, in , he stated:. See the discussion in Wesberry v. As stated by the Court in Bain Peanut Co. Pinson, U. But cf. See the discussion of the concept of floterial districts in Davis v. Mann, post, pp. For a discussion of the formal apportionment formulae prescribed for the allocation of seats in state legislatures, see Dixon, Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power, 38 Notre Dame Law. See also The Book of the States , In rejecting a suggestion that the representation of the newer Western States in Congress should be limited so that it would never exceed that of the original States, the Constitutional Convention plainly indicated its view that history alone provided an unsatisfactory basis for differentiations relating to legislative representation.
See Wesberry v. Instead, the Northwest Ordinance of , in explicitly providing for population-based representation of those living in the Northwest Territory in their territorial legislatures, clearly implied that, as early as the year of the birth of our federal system, the proper basis of legislative representation was regarded as being population.
Determining the size of its legislative bodies is, of course, a matter within the discretion of each individual State. Nothing in this opinion should be read as indicating that there are any federal constitutional maximums or minimums on the size of state legislative bodies.
Additionally, the constitutions of seven other States either require or permit reapportionment of legislative representation more frequently than every 10 years. See also U. Although the District Court indicated that the apportionment of the Alabama House under the Senator Amendment was valid and acceptable, we, of course, reject that determination, which we regard as merely precatory and advisory, since the court below found the overall plan, under the proposed constitutional amendment, to be unconstitutional.
See F. See the discussion earlier in this opinion, supra, at U. The Court goes much beyond the necessities of this case in laying down a new "equal population" principle for state legislative apportionment. This principle seems to be an offshoot of Gray v. But whatever the standard, the Court applies it to each house of the State Legislature.
It seems to me that all that the Court need say in this case is that each plan considered by the trial court is "a crazy quilt," clearly revealing invidious discrimination in each house of the Legislature and therefore violative of the Equal Protection Clause. See my concurring opinion in Baker v. I therefore do not reach the question of the so-called "federal analogy.
See my dissenting opinion in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, post, p. Gray involved the use of Georgia's county unit rule in the election of United States Senators, and Wesberry was a congressional apportionment case. All of the parties have agreed with the District Court's finding that legislative inaction for some 60 years, in the face of growth and shifts in population, has converted Alabama's legislative apportionment plan enacted in into one completely lacking in rationality.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Lucas v. I also agree with the Court that it was proper for the District Court, in framing a remedy, to adhere as closely. Under the Court's ruling, it is bound to follow that the legislatures in all but a few of the other 44 States will meet the same fate. Today's holding is that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires every State to structure its legislature so that all the members of each house represent substantially the same number of people; other factors may be given play only to the extent that they do not significantly encroach on this basic "population" principle.
Whatever may be thought of this holding as a piece of political ideology -- and even on that score, the political history and practices of this country from its earliest beginnings leave wide room for debate see the dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J. The Court's constitutional discussion, found in its opinion in the Alabama cases Nos.
Stripped of aphorisms, the Court's argument boils down to the assertion that appellees' right to vote has been invidiously "debased" or "diluted" by systems of apportionment which entitle them to vote for fewer legislators than other voters, an assertion which is tied to the Equal Protection Clause only by the constitutionally frail tautology that "equal" means "equal. Had the Court paused to probe more deeply into the matter, it would have found that the Equal Protection Clause was never intended to inhibit the States in choosing.
This is shown by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole, by the understanding of those who proposed and ratified it, and by the political practices of the States at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is confirmed by numerous state and congressional actions since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the common understanding of the Amendment as evidenced by subsequent constitutional amendments and decisions of this Court before Baker v.
Carr, supra, made an abrupt break with the past in The failure of the Court to consider any of these matters cannot be excused or explained by any concept of "developing" constitutionalism.
It is meaningless to speak of constitutional "development" when both the language and history of the controlling provisions of the Constitution are wholly ignored.
Since it can, I think, be shown beyond doubt that state legislative apportionments, as such, are wholly free of constitutional limitations, save such as may be imposed by the Republican Form of Government Clause Const. So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, the complaints in these cases should all have been dismissed below for failure to state a cause of action, because what.
Before proceeding to my argument, it should be observed that nothing done in Baker v. Carr, supra, or in the two cases that followed in its wake, Gray v. Sanders and Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, from which the Court quotes at some length, forecloses the conclusion which I reach. Baker decided only that claims such as those made here are within the competence of the federal courts to adjudicate.
Although the Court stated as its conclusion that the allegations of a denial of equal protection presented "a justiciable constitutional cause of action," U.
None of the materials was briefed or otherwise brought to the Court's attention. In the Gray case, the Court expressly laid aside the applicability to state legislative apportionments of the "one person, one vote" theory there found to require the striking down of the Georgia county unit system. In Wesberry, involving congressional districting, the decision rested on Art. The Court expressly did not reach the arguments put forward concerning the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, it seems abundantly clear that the Court is entirely free to deal with the cases presently before it in light of materials now called to its attention for the first time. To these I now turn. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or.
The Amendment is a single text. A proposal to split up the Amendment and submit each section to the States as a separate amendment was rejected by the Senate. The comprehensive scope of the second section and its particular reference to the state legislatures preclude the suggestion that the first section was intended to have the result reached by the Court today. If indeed the words of the Fourteenth Amendment speak for themselves, as the majority's disregard of history seems to imply, they speak as clearly as may be against the construction which the majority puts on them.
But we are not limited to the language of the Amendment itself. The history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment provides conclusive evidence that neither those who proposed nor those who ratified the Amendment believed that the Equal Protection Clause limited the power of the States to apportion their legislatures as they saw fit. Moreover, the history demonstrates that the intention to leave this power undisturbed was deliberate, and was widely believed to be essential to the adoption of the Amendment.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens. In the House, Thaddeus Stevens introduced debate on the resolution on May 8.
In his opening remarks, Stevens explained why he supported the resolution although it fell "far short" of his wishes:. Not only Congress, but the several States, are to be consulted. Upon a careful survey of the whole ground, we did not believe that nineteen of the loyal States could be induced to ratify any proposition more stringent than this. He then explained the impact of the first section of the proposed Amendment, particularly the Equal Protection Clause.
Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree. Whatever law protects the white man shall afford 'equal' protection to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in court shall allow the man of color to do the same. These are great advantages over their present codes. Now, different degrees of punishment are inflicted not on account of the magnitude of the crime, but according to the color of the skin.
Now color disqualifies a man from testifying in courts, or being tried in the same way as white men. I need not enumerate these partial and oppressive laws. Unless the Constitution should restrain them, those States will all, I fear, keep up this discrimination and crush to death the hated freedmen.
He turned next to the second section, which he said he considered "the most important in the article. The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States to grant universal suffrage or so to shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the national Government, both legislative and executive. Closing his discussion of the second section, he noted his dislike for the fact that it allowed "the States to discriminate [with respect to the right to vote] among the same class, and receive proportionate credit in representation.
Toward the end of the debate three days later, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amendment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it. No State ever had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without remedy.
The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States. Bingham said, supra, "the second section excludes the conclusion that, by the first section, suffrage is subjected to congressional law.
Much of the debate concerned the change in the basis of representation effected by the second section, and the speakers stated repeatedly, in express terms or by unmistakable implication, that the States retained the power to regulate suffrage within their borders.
Attached as U. The resolution was adopted by the House without change on May Debate in the Senate began on May 23, and followed the same pattern. Speaking for the Senate Chairman of the Reconstruction Committee, who was ill, Senator Howard, also a member of the Committee, explained the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as follows:.
This abolishes all class legislation in the States, and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another. It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws over the white man. Is it not time, Mr.
President, that we extend to the black man, I had almost called it the poor privilege of the equal protection of the law? The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a depostism [ sic ].
Discussing the second section, he expressed his regret that it did "not recognize the authority of the United States over the question of suffrage in the several States. We may as well state it plainly and fairly, so that there shall be no misunderstanding on the subject. It was our opinion that three-fourths of the States of this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, even in any degree or under any restriction, to the colored race.
There was not in the Senate, as there had been in the House, a closing speech in explanation of the Amendment. But because the Senate considered, and finally adopted, several changes in the first and second sections, even more attention was given to the problem of voting rights there than had been given in the House.
In the. Senate, it was fully understood by everyone that neither the first nor the second section interfered with the right of the States to regulate the elective franchise. After having changed the proposed amendment to the form in which it was adopted, the Senate passed the resolution on June 8, Of the 23 loyal States which ratified the Amendment before , five had constitutional provisions for apportionment of at least one house of their respective legislatures which wholly disregarded the spread of population.
Ten more had constitutional provisions which gave primary emphasis to population, but which applied also other principles, such as partial ratios and recognition of political subdivisions, which were intended to favor sparsely settled areas. Nor were these state constitutional provisions merely theoretical. In New Jersey, for example, Cape May County, with a population of 8,, and Ocean County, with a population of 13,, each elected one State Senator, as did Essex and Hudson Counties, with populations of , and ,, respectively.
New York, each of the 60 counties except Hamilton County was entitled to one of the seats in the Assembly. In Vermont, after each county had been allocated one Senator, there were 16 seats remaining to be distributed among the larger counties. Objecting to the inclusion of Florida in the Act of June 25, , Mr.
Farnsworth stated on the floor of the House:. By this constitution, representatives in the Legislature of Florida are apportioned in such a manner as to give to the sparsely populated portions of the State the control of the Legislature. The sparsely populated parts of the State are those where there are very few negroes, the parts inhabited by the white rebels, the men who, coming in from Georgia, Alabama, and other States, control the fortunes of their several counties.
By this constitution, every county in that State is entitled to a representative. There are in that State counties that have not thirty registered voters; yet, under this constitution, every one of those counties is entitled.
This constitution has been submitted to the Senate, and they have found it republican and proper. It has been submitted to your own Committee on Reconstruction, and they have found it republican and proper, and have reported it to this House. The Constitutions of six of the 10 States contained provisions departing substantially from the method of apportionment now held to be required by the Amendment. In North Carolina, 90 of the representatives were apportioned among the counties without regard to population, leaving 30 seats to be distributed by numbers.
It is incredible that Congress would have exacted ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as the price of readmission, would have studied the State Constitutions for compliance with the Amendment, and would then have disregarded violations of it.
Even if one were to accept the majority's belief that it is proper entirely to disregard the unmistakable implications. There is here none of the difficulty which may attend the application of basic principles to situations not contemplated or understood when the principles were framed. The problems which concern the Court now were problems when the Amendment was adopted. By the deliberate choice of those responsible for the Amendment, it left those problems untouched. The years following , far from indicating a developing awareness of the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to problems of apportionment, demonstrate precisely the reverse: that the States retained and exercised the power independently to apportion their legislatures.
In its Constitutions of and , Alabama carried forward earlier provisions guaranteeing each county at least one representative and fixing an upper limit to the number of seats in the House. In , New York adopted a Constitution the peculiar apportionment provisions of which were obviously intended to prevent representation according to population: no county was allowed to have more than one-third of all the Senators, no two counties which were adjoining or "separated only by public waters" could have more than one-half of all the Senators, and whenever any county became entitled to more than three Senators, the total number of Senators was increased, thus preserving to the small counties their original number of seats.
Since the Court now invalidates the legislative apportionments in six States, and has so far upheld the apportionment in none, it is scarcely necessary to comment on the situation in the States today, which is, of course, as fully contrary to the Court's decision as is the record of every prior period in this Nation's history.
Tennessee, which was the subject of Baker v. Carr, and Virginia, scrutinized and disapproved today in No. In this summary of what the majority ignores, note should be taken of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. The former prohibited the States from denying or abridging the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. In Minor v. Happersett , 21 Wall. The Court's discussion there of the significance of the Fifteenth Amendment is fully applicable here with respect to the Nineteenth Amendment as well.
Nothing is more evident than that the greater must. In the present case, we can go still further. If constitutional amendment was the only means by which all men and, later, women, could be guaranteed the right to vote at all, even for federal officers, how can it be that the far less obvious right to a particular kind of apportionment of state legislatures -- a right to which is opposed a far more plausible conflicting interest of the State than the interest which opposes the general right to vote -- can be conferred by judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Mention should be made finally of the decisions of this Court which are disregarded or, more accurately, silently overruled today. Minor v. Happersett, supra, in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not. Other cases are more directly in point. In Colegrove v. Barrett, U.
Smith, F. The District Court stated that it was aware that the plaintiffs' allegations were "notoriously true" and that. This Court dismissed the appeal "for the want of a substantial federal question. In Kidd v. McCanless, Tenn. The complaint alleged that. Without dissent, this Court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal.
In Radford v. Gary, F. The complaint recited the unwillingness or inability of the branches of the state government to provide relief, and alleged that there was no state remedy available. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss. This Court affirmed without dissent. Each of these recent cases is distinguished on some ground or other in Baker v.
Their summary dispositions prevent consideration whether these after-the-fact distinctions are real or imaginary. The fact remains, however, that, between and , four cases raising issues precisely the same as those decided today were presented to the Court. Three were dismissed because the issues presented were thought insubstantial, and, in the fourth, the lower court's dismissal was affirmed.
I have tried to make the catalogue complete, yet to keep it within the manageable limits of a judicial opinion. In my judgment, today's decisions are refuted by. They are unequivocally refuted by history and by consistent theory and practice from the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment until today.
The Court's elaboration of its new "constitutional" doctrine indicates how far -- and how unwisely -- it has strayed from the appropriate bounds of its authority. The consequence of today's decision is that, in all but the handful of States which may already satisfy the new requirements, the local District Court or, it may be, the state courts, are given blanket authority and the constitutional duty to supervise apportionment of the State Legislatures.
It is difficult to imagine a more intolerable and inappropriate interference by the judiciary with the independent legislatures of the States. In the Alabama cases Nos. See ante, pp. The District Court formulated its own plan for the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature by picking and choosing among the provisions of the legislative measures.
See ante, p. Beyond that, the court warned the legislature that there would be still further judicial reapportionment unless the legislature, like it or not, undertook the task for itself. This Court now states that the District Court acted in "a most proper and commendable manner," ante, p.
In the Maryland case No. Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Maryland Senate was constitutionally apportioned. Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, Md. This Court now holds that neither branch of the State Legislature meets constitutional requirements. Post, p. The Court presumes that, since. On this premise, the Court concludes that the Maryland courts need not "feel obliged to take further affirmative action" now, but that.
In the Virginia case No. Mann v. Davis, F. The District Court gave the State Legislature two months within which to reapportion itself in special session, under penalty of being reapportioned by the court. The Virginia Legislature is to be given "an adequate opportunity to enact a valid plan," but if it fails "to act promptly in remedying the constitutional defects in the State's legislative apportionment plan," the District Court is to "take further action.
In Delaware No. Sincock v. Terry, F. By way of prodding, presumably, the court noted that, if no legislative action were taken and the court sustained the plaintiffs' claim,. Five days later, on July 30, , the General Assembly approved a proposed amendment to the State Constitution. On August 7, , the District Court entered an order denying the.
Sims and Baker v. Carr , have become known as the cases that established "one person, one vote. Carr allowed federal courts to hear cases concerning reapportionment and redistricting. After the Supreme Court case of Reynolds v. Sims , the California legislature had to be changed so that the members of each house of the legislature would represent roughly equal numbers of people.
Answers A and B are wrong because those are exactly the kinds of districts that were banned in Reynolds. Baker v. Carr , U. Earl Warren March 19, — July 9, was an American politician and jurist who served as Governor of California from to and Chief Justice of the United States from to The Calendars Committee schedules debate on the major bills, determines their legislative priority and creates a calendar that legislators use on the floor.
This case made it possible for unrepresented voters to have their districts redrawn by federal courts, initiating a decade of lawsuits that would eventually result in a redrawing of the nation's political map. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable. Sims establishes the principle apportionment doctrine of the United States Constitution Constitution : one-person, one-vote.
The American Bill of Rights, inspired by Jefferson and drafted by James Madison, was adopted, and in the Constitution's first ten amendments became the law of the land. What 2 entities are responsible for redistricting in Texas? What practice did the Baker decision address? Baker argued that this violated his right to equal protection as required by the 14th Amendment. How is the state budget constructed in Texas? If the Texas Legislature fails to redistrict, the task of redistricting then falls to the federal district courts.
Sims U. S constitution. The population of Alabama had rapidly grown from 1. Even though most of that growth occurred in urban areas. It also insisted that this apportionment be conducted every 10 years. Despite the increase in population, the apportionment schemes did not reflect the increase in citizens.
Legislative districts in Alabama still reflected the population of and no reapportionment had being conducted since. This inherently nullifies the votes of some citizens and even weighted some more than the other since the distracting scheme did not reflect their population.
After the Supreme Court decided in Baker v. The ones that constitutional challenges. Several individuals across 30 states who have being harmed by redistricting and legislative apportionment schemes brought suit in federal courts. Reynolds v. Sims was one that sought to challenge the apportionment schemes of Alabama and came to court seeking a remedy.
The court declared in Gary v. Further stating that the equal protection clause was not designed for representatives whom represent all citizens to be greater or less.
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